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LAW SCHOOL CLINICS AND THE
FIRST AJVIE:t'\]"DMEl\fT
Jonathan L. Entin t
Professor Babich has provided us with a troubling account of
external pressures brought to bear on a highly regarded clinic at
Tulane Law School. 1 Professor Joy has put the Tulane stmy into
broader context with accounts of other clinics that have encountered
similar criticism and efforts to confine their activities. 2 In this brief
comment, I want to raise questions about the extent to which law
school clinics could successfully assert First Amendment defenses
against outside efforts to restrict their activities in the event that such
pressure were to result in litigation.
The discussion proceeds in three stages. First, I will offer other
examples in which law reform has generated political backlash. The
frequency of the phenomenon should come as no great surp1ise.
Perhaps the haves do not always come out ahead, 3 but just as the race
is not always to the swift or the battle to the strong, 4 we should expect
the haves to defend their position vigorously. 5
Second, I will address some First Amendment issues that bear on
this subject. Specifically, I will examine the implications of Garcetti
v. Ceballos, 6 a 2006 ruling that takes a restrictive view of the speech
rights of public employees and therefore might have troubling
implications for clinics at public law schools. I will also examine
Legal Sendces Corp. v. Velazquez/ a pre-Garcetti case that points in
t Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. E-mail:
jle@case.edu.
1 Adam Babich, De-Lawyering Legislation and Environmental Law Clinics: Can the
Preemption Doctrine Protect Participation Rights?, 61 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1109 (2011).
2 Peter A Joy, Govemment Interference with Law School Clinics and Access to Justice:
When Is There a Legal Remedy?, 61 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1087 (2011).
3 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974).
4 See Ecclesiastes 9:11 ("I again saw under the sun that the race is not to the swift, and
the battle is not to the warriors, and neither is bread to the wise, nor wealth to the disceming, nor
favor to men of ability; for time and chance overtake them all.").
s Cf THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 655 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (noting that
Damon Runyon is said to have observed: "The race is not always to the swift nor the battle to
the strong-but that's the way to bet.").
6 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
7
531 u.s. 533 (2001).
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the other direction by treating the activities of government-funded
lawyers as private speech rather than government speech.
Third, I will pick up on a hint in Garcetti that academic freedom,
which has important First Amendment aspects, might bear on the
extent to which law school clinics enjoy legal protection against some
of the egregious assaults that Professors Babich and Joy recount in
their articles. In doing so, however, I will point to some ambiguities
in the law of academic freedom and in the nature of law schools that
might limit the extent of protection that academic freedom provides to
clinics.
I. LAW REFORMERS AND OTHER TARGETS OF BACKLASH

Dming my first week at Nmihwestem University School of Law,
one of my professors was installed in an endowed chair. In his
remarks at the installation ceremony, Jon Waltz did not address
anything related to the law of evidence or trial procedure, in which he
had gained prominence, 8 or health law, in which he had done
pioneering scholarship. 9 Instead, he talked about his peripheral
involvement in the Chicago 7 case, which grew out of the violence
surrounding the 1968 Democratic National Convention. 10 Waltz
consulted with defense lawyers William Kunstler and Leonard
Weinglass about some evidentiary issues in the case. 11 He also
testified as a defense witness at the retrial of the defendants and their

8 See, e.g., JON R. WALTZ, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (4th ed. !997); JON
R. WALTZ, THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: AN ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1975); JON R.
WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (8th ed. 1995) (a frequently
cited casebook that is still in print as JON R. WALTZ, ROGER C. PARK & RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (11th ed. 2009); JOHN KAPLAN & JON R. WALTZ, THE
TRIAL OF JACK RUBY (1965); Jon R. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. REV. 289 (i 964); Jon R.
Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1097 (1985); Jon R. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the
Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869 (1981).
9 See, e.g., JON R. WALTZ & FRED E. INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1971); Jon R.
Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18
DEPAUL L. REV. 408 (1969); Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628 (1970); Jon R. Waltz & Carol R. Thigpen, Genetic Screening
and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical Issues, 68 NW. U. L. REV. 696 (1973).
10 There is a voluminous literature about that case, especially the original trial. See, e.g.,
JASON EPSTEIN, THE GREAT CONSPIRACY TRIAL: AN ESSAY ON LAW, LIBERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1970); J. ANTHONY LUKAS, THE BARNYARD EPITHET AND OTHER
OBSCENITIES (1970); JOHN SCHULTZ, THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL (rev. ed. 1993).
11 See Jon R. Waltz, On Being Monitored, 212 NATION 113, 113 (1971) [hereinafter
Waltz, Monitored] (noting that his consultation with the Chicago 7 defense team had made him
the target of military intelligence); Jon R. Waltz, Wind-Up of the Chicago 7, 218 NATION 78,78
(1974) (hereinafter Waltz, Wind-Up].
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lawyers on contempt charges after their original convictions were
12
overturned on appeal.
Professor Waltz focused ills remarks at the chairing ceremony on
his connection to the original trial. That chaotic proceeding was
presided over by Judge Julius Hoffman, a prominent graduate of the
law school who had many influential friends and suppmiers. 13 Indeed,
Hoffman was such a prominent alumnus that the law school had
named a classroom for him-a room in which Waltz refused to teach.
Judge Hoffman's supporters were outraged that a faculty member, let
alone one as prominent as Professor Waltz, would have anything to
do with the defense in the case. According to Waltz, the c1itics
approached the dean of the law school and the president of the
university, demanding that he be fired and threatening to withhold
future financial support. Pausing briefly for effect, he continued: "To
their everlasting credit, the dean and the president told those people,
in so many words, to go jump in Lake Michigan." He spent the rest of
his career at Northwestern.
In a similar vein, Edna Smith Primus, the protagonist in In re
Primus, 14 had to go to the Supreme Court to overtum disciplinary
sanctions imposed in connection with a challenge to a local
sterilization policy. Primus, an officer of and cooperating attomey
with the South Carolina affiliate of the Ame1ican Civil Liberties
Union, addressed a meeting of low-income women who had been
sterilized or threatened with sterilization as a condition for continued
receipt of Medicaid benefits. 15 She advised the women of their legal
rights and thereafter wrote to one of. those women saying that the
12 Five of the seven defendants were convicted of at least some of the charges against
them. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overturned the criminal convictions
against those five defendants and remanded for a new triaL United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d
340 (7th Cir. 1972). The Department of Justice decided against a retrial of the substantive case.
In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1307 n.l (N.D. IlL 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d
813 (7th Cir. 1974); see Waltz, Wind-Up, supra note 11, at 79.
All of the defendants as well as Kunstler and Weinglass were held in contempt for their
conduct during the original trial. The Seventh Circuit reversed all of the contempt convictions
but remanded many of those counts for retrial before a different judge. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d
3 89 (7th Cir. 1972). Professor Waltz testified for the defense at the contempt retriaL At one
point during his testimony, the visiting judge presiding over the retrial asked: "Are you a
movement lawyer?" SCHULTZ, supra note 10, at 380. Waltz was, in fact, a Republican. !d.;
Waltz, Monitored, supra note 11, at 113. Several years later he ran unsuccessfully as a GOP
candidate for the illinois Appellate Court. Jon R. Waltz, Some Firsthand Observations on the
Election ofJudges, 63 JUDJCA TURE 184 (1979).
13 Judge Hoffinan received his law degree from Northwestern in 1915 and served as a
state trial judge before his appointment to the federal bench in 1953. Biographical DirectOJy of
Federal Judges: Hoffman, Julius Jennings, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.ijc.gov/
servletlnGetlnfo?jid= I 064&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 14, 2011 ).
14 436 u.s. 412 (1978).
15 Jd. at414-15.
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ACLU was prepared to represent her on a pro bono basis should she
want to sue. 16 That woman decided not to accept the offer. 17 The state
bar imposed a private reprimand for the letter, which the authorities
regarded as unethical solicitation of a client. 18
The Supreme Court set aside the sanction. The Court emphasized
that Primus had not solicited a prospective client in person and that
her letter did not involve any prospect of "pecuniary gain." 19 Rather,
she was promoting her "personal political beliefs" and "the civilliberties objectives of the ACLU" by advising the woman ofher legal
rights. 20 The letter "comes within the generous zone of First
Amendment protection reserved for associational freedoms." 21 The
record contained no evidence of undue influence, overr-eaching,
misrepresentation, or invasion of privacy that might have justified
professional discipline, 22 nor did it present any threat of frivolous
claims that provides the basis for the bmntry doctrine. 23
Both of these situations involved one-time episodes. More
analogous to some of the challenges that law school clinics face is the
effmi of several states to shut dmvn the NAACP's litigation efforts at
the height of the civil rights movement. The leading example
involved Virginia's attempt to outlaw the association's desegregation
lawsuits as a prohibited form of barratry, but several other states also
pursued the same goal. 24 The theory was that the NAACP controlled
the litigation and induced unsuspecting plaintiffs to lend their names
to cases which they otherwise had no interest in pursuing. 25 The state
legislature therefore amended its laws against soliciting legal business
to include agents of an organization that hired a lawyer in connection

16
17

Jd. at 416.
Jd. at 417. The woman might have been pressured by her physician to drop the suit, but

that possibility was never an issue in the proceedings. She took her youngest child to the
doctor's office for an apparently routine visit. The doctor, in the presence of his lawyer, asked
the woman to sign a document stating that she would not sue. I d.
IB See id. at 417-21.
J9 I d. at 422.
10 Jd. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied heavily on its earlier ruling in NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See Primus, 436 U.S. at 427-28; infra notes 28-31 and
accompanying text.
11 Primus, 436 U.S. at 431.
11 Id. at 434-35.
13 Id. at 436-37. In reaching these conclusions, the Court distinguished a companion
mling that upheld the imposition of sanctions against a private attorney for directly approaching
two 18-year-old women who had been injured in an automobile accident and offering to
represent them on a contingent-fee basis. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
24

See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE

SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 273-74 (1994).
15 See NAACP v. Harrison, 116 S.E.2d 55, 65-66 (Va. 1960), rev 'd sub nom. NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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with any case to which the group was not a pmiy and in which it had
.
.
26
no pecumary mterest.
The Supreme Court ultimately thwarted this stratagem, but not
before the effmi diveiied considerable time and resources that the
organization might have devoted to even more aggressive legal
assaults on racism. 27 In NAACP v. Button, 28 the Court held that the
amended Virginia barrahy statute violated the First Amendment. The
NAACP's legal activities were a fonn of political expression and
association that enjoyed constitutional protection?9 Although the state
had a legitimate interest in regulating the ethics and integrity of the
legal profession, that interest did not justify the infringement on First
Amendment freedoms that the regulation embodied. 30 The NAACP's
activities did not pose a danger of conflict of interest or financial gain
by lawyers at the expense of their clients, so the state could not forbid
the targeted mrangements. 31
A final example of external pressure involves the legal services
program. Originally part of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the
federal antipoverty agency, the legal services program provides

26 The Virginia legislative package included several other measures aimed at undermining
the NAACP's litigation efforts. See TUSHNET, supra note 24, at 274-75. TI1e state courts
invalidated the other measures. See NAACP v. Harrison, I 16 S.E.2d at 72; NAACP Legal Def.
& Educ. Fund v. Harrison, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 864 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1962).
27 TUSHNET, supra note 24, at 273-74.
2s 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
29 /d. at 428-29.
30 /d. at 439-40.
31 /d. at 443-44.
This decision should be read against the background of concerted efforts by southern
states to divert lhe NAACP from its larger mission, a move that was intended to reduce the civil
rights activism that segregationists suspected the organization of fomenting. See generally
NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSTVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH
DURING THE 1950's, at 212-24; TUSHNET, supra note 24, at 283-300; Walter F. Murphy, The
South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Lav.,s, 12 W. POL. Q. 371, 374-80, 386-88 (1959). The
Supreme Court rejected efforts to force the association to turn over its membership lists to state
and local officials and struck down some other fonns of harassment.
On attempts to force disclosure of membership lists, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rei.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Louisiana ex
rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). The Alabama authorities did not get the
message right away. Their case returned to the Supreme Court three more times. See NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 360 U.S. 240 (1959) (per curiam); NAACP v. Gallion, 368 U.S. 16
(1961) (per curiam); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964). For the full
history of the Alabama case, see id. at 289-93.
On oilier southern harassment of the NAACP, see, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960) (invalidating an Arkansas law requiring all public school teachers to disclose annually all
organizations to which they belonged or contributed over the previous five years); Gibson v.
Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (holding that a state legislative committee
could not compel the president of a local NAACP branch to produce membership records in
connection with his testimony because the committee had failed to show sufficient need for the
information).
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lawyers for low-income persons around the nation. 32 Because legal
services lawyers sometimes challenge powerful private interests as
well as local officials and policies, the program has generated a fair
amount of controversy. In its early years, several governors opposed
the program. 33 The most prominent example involved Governor
Ronald Reagan's 1970 veto of a grant to California Rural Legal
Assistance, a high-profile agency that had successfully litigated test
cases on behalf of agricultural workers, welfare recipients, and
Medicaid patients. 34 After a special commission made up of three
state supreme court justices from elsewhere in the country exonerated
CRLA of all charges of improper conduct asserted by Reagan's
antipoverty director, OEO devised a compromise under which CRLA
received continued funding while the state got a planning grant for
another experimental program and the governor withdrew his veto. 35
Even after the 1974 passage of legislation establishing the Legal
Service Corporation as an independent, nonprofit entity, 36 the
program has remained controversiaL In addition to the limitations at
issue in Velazquez/ 7 LSC-funded programs and attorneys face many
statutory restrictions, including bans on political activity, lobbying,
fee-generating cases, and litigation relating to school desegregation
and most abortions; there also are stringent limitations on class
actions. 38 Some of these restrictions have always applied to the
32 For a detailed account of the creation of the legal services program, see EARL JOHNSON,
JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRA!vl
39-70 (1974). For an account of the creation of local legal services agencies, see id. at 71-102.
l3 See ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURJNG EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A
BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2007) (noting that
governors of Florida, Connecticut, Arizona, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, and
Mississippi took actions restricting funding to legal services programs); JOHNSON, supra note
32, at 193 (stating that governors of five states vetoed funding for Legal Services). For other
examples of controversies arising from legal services efforts, see id.
34 See Michael Bennett & Cruz Reynoso, Califomia Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA):
Survival of a Poverty Law Practice, l CHICANO L. REV. l, 7 (1972); Jerome B. Falk, Jr. &
Stuart R Pollak, Political Jnte1jerence with Publicly Funded Lawyers: The CRLA Controversy
and the Future ofLegal Services, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 599, 606-10 (1973).
3 5 For detailed accounts of the CRLA controversy, see HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note
33, at 15-16; Bennett & Reynoso, supra note 34, at 23-77; Faile & Pollak, supra note 34, at
608-41.
3 6 Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (2006)). On the background to the corporation's creation,
see HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 33, at 19-22.
3 7 See ilifi·a notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
38 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996e(d)(5), 2996f(b) (2006). In addition, various appropriations
riders have imposed additional restrictions on LSC programs, including bans on advocacy
relating to welfare reform and representation of foreign nationals. See HOUSEMAN & PERLE,
supra note 33, at 36-37; Rebekah Diller & Emily Savner, Restoring Legal Aid for the Poor: A
Call to End Draconian and Wastefitl Restrictions, 36 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 687, 693 (2009);
Andrew Haber, Rethinldng the Legal Services Corporation's Program Integrity Rules, 17 VA. J.
Soc. PoL'Y & L. 404,419-23 (2010). For discussion of the restrictions on welfare litigation, see
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program, while others were adopted after the Reagan administration's
unsuccessful campaign to abolish the program 39 or in the wake of the
Republican victory in the 1994 congressional elections. 40
Controversy over the legal services program, both under OEO and
later under LSC, was quite predictable. To the extent that the program
subsidizes lawsuits that challenge public policies, elected officials can
be expected to react with skepticism if not outright hostility. A similar
phenomenon occuned in connection with the cmm11unity action
program, which was the centerpiece of the War on Poverty overseen
by OEO. Mayors and other officials around the nation sought either to
eliminate or to control local corrununity action agencies in order to
minimize the political threat that those agencies posed. 41 As the
sociologist Lewis Coser put it: "I know of no government in history
which has deliberately financed its own opposition."42 This
observation does not necessarily make the criticisms of legal service
legitimate, but it helps to explain their existence.
Although the situations described in this section differ from those
that Professors Babich and Joy discuss in their articles, we should
anticipate similar reactions from those powerful entities that law
school clinics challenge. The mlings in Primus and Button suggest
that clinics might invoke constitutional protections to ward off some
restrictions that might mise from outside attacks, but those attacks do
not involve claims of barratry or other ethical lapses of the sort that
were at issue in those cases. Nevertheless, a couple of other relatively
recent Supreme Court decisions might bear on the status of law
school clinics that face external pressure to handle only small cases
on behalf of individual clients instead of larger cases that could have
broader social, political, or economic impact.

infra notes 5 5-64 and accompanying text.
39 See generally HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 33, at 29-33; Ken Englade, The LSC
Under Siege, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1987, at 66; Angela F. Turner, Comment, President Reagan and
the Legal Sen,ices Corporation, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 711 (1982).
40 See supra note 38.
41 See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAxiMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: COMMUNITY
ACTION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY 131-35, 142-46, 150-54 (1969); Elliott A. Krause,
Functions of a Bureaucratic Ideology: "Citizen Participation," 16 Soc. PROBS. 129, 139-40
(1968); Comment, Pm1icipation of the Poor: Section 202(a)(3) Organizations Under the
Economic Opportzmity Act of 1964,75 YALE L.J. 599, 610-11, 613-14, 616-17 (1966)
42 Quoted in Krause, supra note 41, at 140. Coser was hardly an advocate of consensus
politics. He made his academic reputation with a thoughtful analysis of the uses of division. See
LEWIS COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956).
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ll. SOME RECENT FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

Many law school clinics are part of public law schools, so
restrictions on their activities might have First Amendment
implications. Accordingly, this section considers the extent to which
governmental restrictions on clinics affiliated with public law schools
are likely to survive a constitutional challenge. It focuses on two
recent Supreme Court decisions, both involving lawyers, that seem to
point in different directions with regard to law school clinics.
The first case, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 43 found that public employees
have no First Amendment protection for speech made in connection
with their official duties. 44 The case arose when a deputy district
attorney, following an apparently common conversation with defense
counsel in a criminal case, raised persistent questions about the
accuracy of an affidavit that the office had submitted in support of a
search warrant. 45 The deputy was called to testify as a defense witness
at a suppression hearing. 46 Thereafter, he alleged, his superiors
unconstitutionally retaliated against him in various ways. 47
The Court recognized that "the First Amendment protects a public
employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen
addressing matters of public concem"48 but nonetheless rejected
Ceballos' claim because "his expressions were made pursuant to his
[official] duties" as a deputy district attorney. 49 After all, "[r]estricting
speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional
responsibilities ... simply reflects the exercise of employer control
over what the employer itself has commissioned or created. " 50
Ceballos' activities were not those of a citizen but of a public
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Garcetti is the latest in a series of cases in which the Court has addressed the speech
rights of public employees. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that
public employees enjoy First Amendment protection for speech addressing matters of public
concern but that an assistant district attorney's survey relating to internal policies did not, for the
most part, address matters of public concern); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)
(applying a balancing test and holding that a teacher could not be dismissed for writing letters to
a local newspaper critical of district policies because the letters did address matters of public
concern). See generally Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process
Solution to a First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115 (criticizing the Supreme
Court's approach to speech by public employees); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First
Amendment Lmv of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHA!v! L. REV. 33 (2008) (endorsing and
explaining the Court's approach in this area).
45 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413-14.
46 !d. at 414-15. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. !d. at 415.
47
Ceballos claimed that his job responsibilities were changed and that he was transferred
to a different courthouse and passed over for promotion. !d.
48 !d. at 417.
49 !d. at 421.
so !d. at 421-22.
•13
44
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employee. Although the First Amendment allows public employees to
"contribut[ e] to the civic discourse," it does not give them "a right to
perform their jobs however they see fit." 51 Any other conclusion
would lead to "permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of
governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound
principles of federalism and the separation of powers. " 52
The logic of Garcetti suggests that clinicians at public law schools
could not asse1i a successful First Amendment defense against
restrictions on the types of cases they pursue if those restrictions are
imposed by officials who have supervisory authority over their work.
Clinicians at such schools are public employees, and the work they do
in selecting cases and representing clients is part of their official
duties. Because Garcetti says that the First Amendment offers no
protection to public employees in the performance of their official
duties, it is likely that restrictions on the types of cases that clinics at
public law schools may take would survive a legal challenge.
Two caveats are in order before we accept this conclusion. First, it
is possible to argue that cases handled by clinics at law schools
involve matters of public concem. Garcetti by its terms does not
apply to such situations. Unfortunately, the facts of Garcetti show
that this argument cmmot succeed. Criminal cases, like those at issue
there, do involve the public. Indeed, crime has long been a matter of
public concern. But the Garcetti Court focused less on the general
interest in crime than on the work responsibilities of the deputy
district attorney. His job was to work on criminal cases subject to
oversight by his superiors. On this view, clinicians are employed to
handle cases and train aspiring lawyers. In doing so, they are acting
not as citizens but as public employees.
Second, it might be that the apparently bright-line rule of Garcetti
does not apply in the academic setting. The Court recognized that
"expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction"
might enjoy broader constitutional protection but explicitly declined
to resolve that question. 53 We shall tum to the question of academic
freedom in the next section. Before doing so, however, we should
address the other recent case that bears on the First Amendment rights
of lawyers who are employed by the govemment.
!d. at 422.
!d. at 423; cf Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976) (rejecting a tem1inated
police officer's procedural due process claim by noting that federal courts are "not the
appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily
by public agencies" despite "the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable" in
that process and concluding that "[t]he United States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed
to require federal judicial review for every such error" (footnote omitted)).
53 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
51

52
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As noted earlier, legal services lawyers face several statutory
restrictions on their work. 54 One of those resh·ictions was struck down
in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez. 55 At issue in that case was an
appropriations tider that prohibited legal services lawyers from
seeking to amend or challenge the constitutionality of welfare laws. 56
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the rider funded
government speech. Earlier cases, notably Rust v. Sullivan, 57 had
upheld viewpoint-based restrictions where the government itself was
the speaker or where the government had used private speakers to
.
58
convey 1ts own message.
According to the Velazquez Collli, the legal services program "was
designed to facilitate plivate speech, not to promote a governmental
message." 59 Moreover, the rider placed "a substantial restriction" on
that plivate speech. 60 It undemuned the "traditional role" of lawyers 61
and, by preventing them from presenting selious questions about the
validity of welfare statutes and regulations, also threatened the
independence and integrity of courts that rely on attorneys who are
supposed to advance "all the reasonable and well-grounded
arguments necessaty for proper resolution" of cases. 62 Because the
rider sought "to draw lines around the [legal services] program to
exclude fi·om litigation those arguments and theories Congress finds
unacceptable but which by their nature are within the province of the
63
comis to consider,"
the resttiction constituted impermissible
viewpoint discrinlination in violation of the First Amendment. The

5"

See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
56 The tider at issue provided in relevant part prohibited the use of LSC funds for the
purpose of
55

initiat[ing] legal representation or participal[ing] in any other way, in litigation,
lobbying, or mlemaking, involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare
system, except that this paragraph shall not be construed to preclude a recipient from
representing an individual eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a
welfare agency !f such relief does not involve an effort to amend or othenvise
challenge existing law in effect on the date of the initiation of the representation.
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. l 04-134,
§ 504(a)(l6), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-55 to 1321-56 (emphasis added). This rider was earned over
in subsequent years and remained in effect when Velazque::; was decided. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at
538.
57 500 U.S. 173 (1991 ).
53
Velazque:::, 531 U.S. at 541. Rust upheld a ban on discussion of abortion by federally
funded family-planning programs. 500 U.S. at 179-80, 193-95.
59 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.
60 !d. at 544.
61 !d.
6
' !d. at 545.
63 !d. at 546.
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Court rejected the argument that the restriction sought only to define
the scope of the program, waming: "Congress cannot recast a
condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every
case, lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic
exercise. " 64
Velazquez might help law school clinics that receive government
funding to fend off some restrictions on the types of cases that they
take. If publicly funded law school clinics are engaged in private
speech, then governmental prohibitions or limitations on their work
might constitute viewpoint discrimination. Of course, the answer
might depend on the natme of the govemmentally imposed
restriction. After all, Velazquez did not address a complete ban on
certain kinds of cases; the rider at issue limited the kinds of legal
arguments that legal services lawyers could make in cases that those
lawyers were pennitted to handle. The Supreme Court noted that
federal law prohibits legal services lawyers :fi-om working on whole
classes of cases-including most crinunal cases as well as matters
involving nontherapeutic abortions, school desegregation, and
selective service-but did not suggest that such subject-matter bans
were constitutionally problematic. 65 Velazquez emphasized that the
govemment had no obligation to maintain a legal services program
but that, having decided to create such a program, the government
could not insulate its laws fi:om constitutional attack by the lawyers it
had chosen to fund. 66
Two points seem to follow from this discussion. One is that
properly promulgated restrictions on the kinds of cases that publicly
funded law school clinics are allowed to take or the types of clients
that they are pennitted to represent might pass muster. Velazquez
apparently rejects only limitations on the kinds of legal arguments
that govemment-subsidized lawyers may assert. On this view,
subject-matter restrictions are less problematic than viewpoint-based
limitations.
The other is that, read narrowly, Velazquez might not be directly
relevant to clinics at private law schools (and perhaps at some public
schools) that do not receive govemment ftmds. After all, that case
addressed only a funding restriction. But the decision rejected the
!d. at 547.
Jd. at 537-38.
66 Id. at 548. The govemment does have a constitutional obligation to provide legal
counsel to indigent criminal defendants. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). But see Scott v. Tilinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)
(limiting the right to counsel to cases in which a defendant is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment). The Supreme Court has never required any specific method for providing
lawyers to indigent c1iminal defendants who are entitled to counsel.
64
65

i
.
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restriction as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Accordingly,
if government cannot condition the award of funds on a grantee's
agreement not to advance certain kinds of legal arguments, it must
follow that government may not directly forbid lawyers from
advancing those arguments even if the lawyers do not receive public
subsidies. Again, however, narrower restrictions could be more
difficult for unsubsidized clinics to attack than viewpoint-based
restrictions.
This second point receives some support from a case involving a
previous attempt to restrict the work of Professor Babich's clinic. In
1999, the Louisiana Supreme Court promulgated regulations that
tightened eligibility requirements for clients of law school clinics and
prohibited law students from serving as attorneys under the studentpractice rule for any client whom the clinic had contacted for the
purpose of representation. 67 The new rules, apparently adopted in
response to political pressure and complaints from business
interests, 68 survived a constitutional challenge.
In Southern Christian Leadership Coriference v. Supreme Court of
Louisiana, 69 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
upheld the revised student-practice rule. The more stringent clienteligibility requirements promoted the goal of providing legal
representation to those who could not afford to hire their own
lawyers. 70 The limits on solicitation satisfied the First Amendment.
Distinguishing Button and Primus, which involved efforts to ban
solicitation of clients, the Fifth Circuit explained that the Louisiana
rule did not prohibit any speech but merely limited the roles that
clinic students could play in cases in which the clinic had made the
initial contact with the client. 71 Because the students were not and
could not be licensed as lawyers, the rule simply forbade them from
acting as attorneys in certain clinic cases; they remained free to work
as paralegals, researchers, or trial aides. 72 Distinguishing Velazquez,
the court explained that the rule did not restrict the types of cases that
67 Under the revised rules, clinics could represent individuals or families with income up
to 200 percent of federal poverty guidelines and community organizations if more than half of
their members qualified for individual representation under the rule; such organizations also had
to certify that they lacked the resources to hire private counseL LA. SUP. CT. R. XX, §§ 4-5. The
restriction on students appearing in the role of attorneys applied to any case in which anyone
associated with a clinic had initiated contact with the individual or organization./d. § 10.
68 For the background to the amended Louisiana student-practice rule, see Peter A. Joy,
Political lnteiference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying Access to Justice, 74 TuL. L.
REV. 235,243-51 (1999).
69 252 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2001).
70 I d. at 789.
71 !d.
72 !d. at 789-90.
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clinics could take or the kinds of arguments that they could advance
on behalf of those clients; the mle also did not actually forbid clinics
fi·om soliciting clients but merely defined the roles that clinic students
could play on behalf of clients whom the clinic had legitimately
solicited. 73 Finally, the alleged animus of politicians and business
groups did not affect the validity of the otherwise viewpoint-neutral
mles. There was no evidence that the Louisiana Supreme Comi
shared such animus; at most the plaintiffs claimed that the comi had
succumbed to political pressure. 74If these very restrictive regulations can pass constitutional
muster, 75 law school clinics could face a daunting task in fending off
stringent but carefully drafted limits on their activities. Regulations
such as those struck down in Button, Primus, and Velazquez
presumably could not be imposed on clinics, but facially neutral
regulations that might undermine clinic operations might be upheld.
Before concluding that reshictions on clinics are effectively immune
from legal chall.enge, we should recall the Fifth Circuit's pointed
remark that neither Tulane University nor any of its law school clinics
challenged the Louisiana student-practice restrictions. 76 It is not clear
that the case would have come out differently had the university or
any of its clinics been parties to the case, but the statement might
imply that they could have advanced arguments based on academic
freedom. The Garcetti Court also alluded to academic freedom but
did not address the issue in any detail. 77 The next section discusses
that subject.

III. LAW SCHOOL CLINICS AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Academic freedom encompasses "fi·eedom of inqui1y and research;
freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of
extra-mural utterance and action." 78 Although the idea of academic
freedom emerged from conflicts between faculty members and boards
of trustees, 79 the Supreme Comi has recognized that at least some
!d. at 791-92.
!d. at 794.
75 The executive director of the Association of A..merican Law Schools characterized the
Louisiana regulation as the "most restrictive" of its kind. Joy, supra note 68, at 238 (quoting
Carl C. MonJe).
76 252 F.3d at 787-88.
77 See supra text accompanying note 53.
7 8 AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1915 DECLARATION OF PRll-lCIPLES ON ACADEMIC
FREEDOM & ACADEMIC TENURE 292 (1915), available at bt1p://www.aaup.org/NR!rdon1yres
I A6520A9D-OA9 A-4 7B3-B 550-C006B5B224 E7/0/1915Declaration.pdf.
79 See MATTHEW W. FINKJN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES
OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 24-27 (2009) (chronicling the tensions between academics
and their governing boards, culminating with the fonnation of the AAUP and the promulgation
73

74
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aspects of academic freedom enjoy First Amendment protection. 80
For example, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 81 Chief Justice Warren's
plmality opinion warned that "impos[ing] any strait jacket upon the
intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the
future of om Nation." 82 Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
offered a more extensive defense of free inquiry. 83 A decade later, in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 84 the Court characterized academic
freedom as having "transcendent value to all of us." 85 Those
statements were dicta. In Swee.ry, the Court found that a state attorney
general's investigation of allegedly subversive activities had not been
properly authorized; 86 in Keyishian, the Court held that a statute
requiring the dismissal of faculty members for "treasonable or
seditious" utterances was tmconstitutionally vague. 87
In other cases, however, concerns about academic freedom appear
to have played a more central role. For example, in Regents of the
University of Michigan v. Ewing, 88 the Court called for deference to
faculty judgments about students' academic performance. That case
involved a medical student who was dismissed for failing a

of the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom); Judith Areen, Government as
Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and
Govemance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 952-53 (2009) (describing the emergence of conflicts between
the faculty and governing boards resulting from the move away from narrow, religious-focused
curriculums, to science-based instruction, original research and the development of scholarly
expertise in a broad variety of disciplines); J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special
Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251, 273 (1989) ("Disputes tended to be
internal to the university, and academic freedom became conceived as an adjustment of rights
among participants."); David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and
"Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1990, at 227, 233 (summarizing and supporting the AAUP's criticisms of boards of
trustees' efforts to control professorial works as unduly constraining academic freedom).
80 This essay focuses only on the ability of university-based law school clinics to assert
First Amendment-based academic freedom against external pressure. Some of the cases
discussed in this paragraph involve constitutionally based claims of academic freedom by
individuals against external pressure. The extent to which academic freedom protects individual
faculty members against adverse actions by trustees, administrators, or other faculty members is
beyond the scope of this essay, but the question has generated thoughtful debate. Compare
Rabban, supra note 79, at 280-300 (arguing that the First Amendment protects the academic
freedom of individual professors in some circumstances), with Byme, supra note 79, at 301-ll
(arguing that constitutional academic freedom does not protect individual faculty members
against institutional action).
Bl 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (Wan·en, C.J., plurality opinion).
82 I d. at 250.
B3 I d. at 261-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
84 385 u.s. 589 (!967).
85 !d. at 603.
86 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 253-55.
87 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604; see id at 593 (quoting the statute).
ss 474 U.S. 214 (!985).
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comprehensive exam. 89 In rejecting the student's procedural due
process claim, the Court explained: "When judges are asked to review
the substance of a genuinely academic decision, ... they should show
great respect for the facu1ty 's professional judgment. " 90 The judicimy
should overturn an academic decision only if "it is such a substantial
depmture from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the
person or committee responsible did not actually exercise
professional judgment." 91
Similarly, the Court has invoked academic freedom in two of its
most significant affinnative action cases. Justice Powell's controlling
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,92 for
instance, emphasized that academic fi·eedom was "a special concern
of the First Amendment" that entitled the university to broad
discretion in selecting its students. 93 That discretion was not
unfettered: Justice Powell concluded that the quota system under
which a state university's medical school reserved a specified number
of seats in each entering class for members of designated racial and
ethnic minorities violated the Equal Protection Clause. 94 A quartercentmy later, in Grutter v. Bollinger, 95 a five-justice majority
endorsed Justice Powell's approach. In upholding the University of
Michigan Law School's consideration ofrace as one factor in making
admissions decisions, the Court deferred to the university's academic
judgment about the educational importance of a diverse student
body. 96
Bakke suggests, however, this deference to academic judgments
has its limits. As the Court explained in University of Pennsylvania v.
EEOC, 97 a university has no privilege to withhold internal and
external peer reviews of an unsuccessful candidate for promotion and
tenure when the candidate alleges that her rejection· violated Title
Vll. 98 Academic freedom does not protect universities from
compliance with such generally applicable civil1ights laws. 99 Nor is
Bakke the only affirn1ative action case in which the Court has rejected
s9 Id at 216.
Id. at 225.

90

Jd.
438 u.s. 265 (1978).
93 Id at 312.
94 I d. at 315-20.
95 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
96 Id. at 328-29.
97 493 u.s. 182 (1990).
98
Id. at 189.
99 I d. at 198 (reasoning that the protections of academic freedom are generally limited to
cases where the government conduct intends to or does in fact direct the content of the
university discourse).
91

92
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a university's race-based admissions program. In Gratz v.
Bollinger, 100 a companion case to Grutter, the Court invalidated the
point system that the University of Michigan used for undergraduate
admissions because that system gave all minority applicants the same
substantial number of points and thus did not provide for
individualized consideration. 101
What do these cases imply about whether law school clinics could
successfully assert an academic freedom claim to fend off external
pressures on their work? At first blush, clinics seem to have a
powerful argument that their operations fall within the classic
definition of freedom to teach. Clinics are the predominant
mechanism by which law schools satisfy the accreditation
requirement to provide students with "live-client or other real-life
practice experiences," 102 but that requirement does not mean that
schools must operate their own clinics or provide every student with
such real-life practice opportunities. 103 In other words, a law school's
decision to operate a clinic appears to represent exactly the kind of
academic judgment that deserves judicial deference.
There are at least two reasons to question whether an academic
freedom argument would succeed in court. First, it might be argued
that academic freedom as recognized in the cases does not apply to
the work of law school clinics. Institutional academic freedom, which
protects universities from external interference, traditionally has been
justified in the name of defending "the fundamental academic values
of disinterested inquiry, reasoned and critical discourse, and liberal
education." 104 On this view, the government might well be permitted
to regulate aspects of universities that are "unrelated to liberal
studies." 105 This is so because the concept of academic freedom rests
on a commitment to detachment and disinterestedness. 106 Training
students for the labor market is only peripherally, if at all, related to
those values, the argument goes, so the governrnent might have
greater latitude to regulate activities relating to vocational training. 107
Law school clinics inculcate skills that are designed to prepare
539 u.s. 244 (2003).
!d. at 271-75.
102 ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools Standard 302(b)(1) (2010-2011).
1oJ !d. Interpretation 302-5.
104 Byrne, supra note 79, at 338.
105 !d.
106 See id. at 333-35 (discussing the merits of knowledge pursued with detachment as
disinterestedness, arguing that this is one of the "indigenous values served by universities").
107 See id. at 332 (arguing that there is no reason in principle why the government cannot
regulate university training encouraging the development of practical, career-related skills as it
does private enterprises).
100

10 1
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students for legal practice rather than detached and disinterested
inquiry, so perhaps their work falls outside the boundaries of
academic freedom, however this concept applies to other aspects of
what law professors (including clinicians) do.
There are other reasons to question whether academic freedom
necessarily insulates law school clinics from external regulation.
Clinics enable law students to appear in comi, under faculty
supervision, in circumstances where they otherwise could not
represent clients because the students have not been admitted to the
bar. Student-practice rules are an integral pmi of the clinical
experience: without such rules, promulgated by the judicimy, law
students would not be able to perform lawyers' roles. Because
students have no independent right to appear in court on behalf of
clients, it is not clear that invoking academic freedom will add much
to the more general First Amendment arguments against contentbased regulations of legal practice that prevailed in NAACP v. Button
and Legal Sen1ices Cmp. v. Velazquez 108 or the First Amendment
arguments that failed in Southem Christian Leadership Coriference v.
r>
· ·
109
OJrL owszana.
S Lpreme e-ourt
CONCLUSION

It is not at all clear that either general First Amendment doctrine or
academic freedom, to the extent that this concept rests on First
Amendment considerations, will protect law school clinics from at
least some external regulation. Nevertheless, the lmcertain prospects
of judicial vindication should not occasion despair. After all,
academic freedom is more than a legal concept that is enforced by
courts. It also represents a powerful intellectual and social norm that
110
can be used in the public m·ena to fend off attacks on universities.
Professor Waltz's experience at Northwestern, where the law school
and the central administration resisted calls for his ouster because of
his role in the Chicago 7 case, 111 offers an optimistic example of how
this nonn can be used effectively.

See supra notes 28-31 & 55-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
no See generally FINJUN & POST, supra 79.
11 1 See supra Part I.
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